We provide a micro-empirical link between the large literature on credit and house prices and the burgeoning literature on macroprudential policy. Using loan-level data on Irish mortgages originated between 2003 and 2010, we construct a measure of credit availability which varies at the borrower level as a function of income, wealth, age, interest rates and prevailing market conditions around Loan to Value ratios (LTV), Loan to Income ratios (LTI) and monthly Debt Service Ratios (DSR). We deploy a property-level house price model which shows that a ten per cent increase in credit available leads to an 1.5 per cent increase in the value of property purchased. Coefficients from this model are then used to fit values under scenarios of macroprudential restrictions on LTV, LTI and DSR on credit availability and house prices in Ireland for 2003 and 2006. Our results suggest that macroprudential limits would have had substantial impacts on house prices, and that both the level at which they are set and the timing of their introduction is a crucial determinant of their impact on housing values.
Introduction
Given the key role of the housing market in credit and asset price cycles, as well as the link between housing finance and the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; Duca et al., 2010 Duca et al., , 2011a , regulatory authorities have recently put a greater focus on the use of macro-prudential instruments.
Such macro-prudential policy (MPP) measures are aimed at breaking the link between credit growth, house prices and banking sector instability as well as building bank and borrower resilience to financial shocks (Kashyap et al., 2011; IMF, 2013) . In particular, macro-prudential tools specifically targeting the mortgage market have become extremely common especially given the role played by the mortgage market in the recent global financial crisis (Elul et al., 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2009) . As part of their overall financial stability toolkit, many countries have imposed restrictions on the Loan to Value (LTV) or Loan to Income (LTI) ratios of originated mortgages. 1 While a large literature exists linking credit flows and house prices, 2 a relatively recent literature has emerged attempting to measure the impact of specific MPP measures in the housing market, mainly using cross-country or single country macroeconomic data (Kuttner and Shim, 2013; Vandenbussche et al., 2015; Cerutti et al., 2015) . The evidence suggests a tentative link between these MPP and house prices with a more conclusive finding on the impact of MPP on credit growth. However, a limitation of these papers is that the majority are at the aggregate level and rely on the use of average indicators in their identification strategy in cross country or single country models. In particular relating to LTI and LTV limits in the mortgage market, this approach may miss the complexity through which these limits impact borrower behaviour which can only be tested with adequate within-country borrower-specific variation. One exception is Igan and Kang (2011) who show, using survey data, that households were more likely to have dampened house price expectations and delayed house purchases in Korea after the introduction of macroprudential limits on LTV and LTI.
Given this gap in the literature, we use loan-level data on roughly two-thirds of the Irish mortgage market between 2003 and 2010 to provide a micro-empirical bridge between the literature on credit and house prices and the nascent literature on the impacts of macroprudential policy. Our aims in this paper are threefold. Firstly, we provide novel insights into the way in which credit conditions such as the LTV, LTI and DSR act to determine the credit available for a heterogeneous distribution of borrowers. We measure credit available in an innovative way at the loan level : for every individual borrower there are three potential mortgages that a bank will supply as a function of the borrowers' income, down-payment and age, combined with prevailing market limits on LTV, LTI and DSR. The credit available to a borrower is then the minimum of the three mortgages calculated, consistent with the way in which a bank would arrive at a credit allocation decision in practice. This measurement of credit availability differs greatly to aggregate measures used in the existing literature (Duca et al., 2011b; Jansen and Krogh, 2011; Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer, 2006) in terms of the granularity of what is being measured and the way in which borrower heterogeneity is directly captured.
Secondly, we use a reduced-form, loan-level house price model to link our measure of credit supply to house prices at the micro-level. This is the first study of which we are aware to use micro-data to link credit, macro-prudential instruments and house prices.
Thirdly, using the coefficients of our loan-level house price model, we trace through the impact of MPP regimes to house prices. Our set-up is extemely flexible in that the user can set levels of LTV, LTI and DSR at any level they wish, with the algorithm recalculating each borrower's credit availability as a function of three new mortgages. This differs greatly from aggregate studies on macroprudential housing instruments, which generally observe an average value for an instrument such as the LTV across the entire market. The framework then allows a change to MPP limits on LTV, LTI and DSR to impact house prices through two channels: directly through a reduction in credit available, and indirectly through the role that reduced regional house prices have on the down-payment available to previous-owners. We highlight two important factors that impact the magnitude of the effect of a set of MPP restrictions on house prices: (i) the stringency of the limits on LTV, LTI or DSR (ii) the point in the housing cycle at which the MPP is implemented.
As well as the aforementioned literature estimating the impact of MPP in aggregate empirical settings, our research is a complement to the burgeoning literature which tests the impact of macroprudential policy in an aggregate set-up through DSGE or structural econometric models (Akram, 2014; Bailliu et al., 2015; Clancy and Merola, 2014; Gerali et al., 2010; Kannan et al., 2012; Quint and Rabanal, 2014) . These papers mainly enter macro-prudential policy into their set-up through aggregate credit growth, bank liabilities limits or the price of credit/external financing premium (see Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) ). These models are not able to disentangle the impact of specific macro-prudential limits such LTI and LTV on credit availability and in turn on house prices. By estimating our model at the borrower level we can go beyond the aforementioned research and can trace through the impact of each of these limits simultaneously.
Where such macro-economic models have channeled specific LTV limits (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2014; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2015; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014) , these are entered as the average LTV.
Given that the average of observed LTV is in fact the intersection of both the supply of credit and the borrowers' demand for leverage, such measures do not cleanly identify pure credit supply impacts.
Additionally where LTI, LTV or DSR limits are in fact simultaneously imposed by macro-prudential authorities these macro-studies cannot specifically test which measure has the greater impact on credit and house prices. Our measure, by focusing on credit availability and allowing each borrower to be limited by one channel, can provide additional insight to existing research.
Our research is also linked to two further literatures. First, our work complements studies at the aggregate level which have studied the link between MPP and financial outcomes such as credit growth, mortgage delinquency, leverage and indebtedness, without looking specifically at the impact on house prices (Wong et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2013; International Monetary Fund, 2011; Cerutti et al., 2015; Jacome and Mitra, 2015) . Second, we build on recent studies that exploit sub-national data and provide evidence of a causal effect of liberalised credit on house prices (Favara and Imbs, 2015; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2014; Adelino et al., 2012; Labonne and Welter-Nicol, 2015; Anenberg et al., 2015) by providing a loan-level estimate of the credit-house price elasticity.
A number of findings emerge. Our estimates suggest that during the Irish housing boom, the majority (70-80 per cent) of borrowers had their credit available determined along the loan-to-income channel, with 20-30 per cent being cut off by monthly debt service ratio (DSR) limits, and only a small amount being cut off by LTV limits. When these measures are combined into our indicator of credit availability and this is included in a log-log house price specification, the elasticity of house prices with respect to credit availability is estimated in our baseline model at 15 per cent, which is extremely close to estimates from Favara and Imbs (2015), who provide the only published estimate of a cleanly-identified causal effect of credit supply on house prices. Across a range of robustness tests, we estimate the elasticity to always be within a range of 12 to 27 per cent. Our micro-level house price model also estimates that a ten per cent increase in income increases house prices by between 2.1 and 2.6 per cent while a ten per cent increase in wealth increases house prices by 2.4-2.5 per cent.
To trace the impact of macro-prudential policy on house prices, we impose two separate regimes which are drawn from the range of international parameterisations of such measures. 3 We then apply these regimes at periods of tighter and looser market conditions for general credit conditions and estimate the new fitted house price distribution under these scenarios. Given that our micro-data framework cannot incorporate general equilibrium housing market effects such as changes to housing supply, impacts on the rental market and the entry of Buy-to-Let investors, we restrict our scenario re-fitting of house prices to the short-run. We do so by starting with observed average house prices in From a policy perspective, our results provide insight for regulators attempting to understand the calibration of MPP measures in the mortgage market. First, the specific parameterisation as well as the instrument matters. We find that LTI is in general the more binding tool relative to LTV and DSR.
However, this balance reverses as tighter caps on LTV and DSR are introduced. Second, the differential between current market credit conditions and the stringency of proposed measures is important. Our results indicate that MPP measures have a smaller impact when market credit conditions are tighter.
This suggest policymakers such take into account the point in the credit cycle when calibrating such instruments.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses data sources and measurement of credit supply; Section 4 describes the impact of macroprudential policy on borrowers' available credit supply; Section 3 presents our house price model, Section4 describes the introduction of MPP regimes and re-fitting of the short-run house price distribution; Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data used come from the Central Bank of Ireland's Loan Level Data (LLD). These files contain information on all loans issued by Irish banks participating in the 2011 Financial Measures Programme (FMP). In the case of the Irish residential mortgage market, these four lenders account for roughly two thirds of the total market, making this a particularly rich source of data. 4 The data have been explained in detail by Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder (2012) . Information is provided on inter alia current mortgage balance, bank, current interest rate, origination and current interest rate type, origination and maturity dates, original installment, current loan to value ratio (LTV), and First Time Buyer status (FTB). Certain characteristics of the borrower are also reported in the data, such as marital status, geographic location, employment group, income and whether the application is joint or single assessment. Crucially from the point of view of this study, the valuation of the property at loan origination is included which provides a borrower-specific house purchase price. These variables are all collected at the mortgage origination date and these data can be combined with the originating mortgage criteria to provide a dataset linking indicators of LTV, LTI and Debt-Service-Ratio (DSR) to house prices.
Given data availability, our sample runs from January 2003 to December 2010. A number of inclusion criteria are applied to the data. Firstly, only primary dwelling (often referred to as owneroccupied) mortgages are considered. Investor or Buy-to-Let (BTL) mortgages are omitted from the data set, as the originating credit decision of the lender, as well as the type of macro-prudential limit that a regulator would set, are distinct across the PDH and BTL segments of the mortgage market. 5
We also restrict loans to those that were for the purpose of home purchase, removing those used for equity release or for refinancing. This restricts the sample to mortgages underlying transactions of properties between two parties. Finally we control for outliers by removing the 99th percentile in our key variables of interest.
The final baseline regression sample consists of 188,405 property purchases. Figure 1 Our approach departs from the extant literature: rather than constructing an index based on aggregate averages or observed drawdown values, we calculate the maximum amount of credit that each borrower could access when applying for a loan (credit available, CA). Our measurement has two key characteristics: (i) it differs for every borrower as a function both of borrower characteristics and prevailing bank lending conditions (ii) it is a function of originating supply-side credit conditions that can be limited by macroprudential policy, namely the LTI, LTV and DSR. These features make our measure of CA well-suited to incorporating the impact of macroprudential limits. The approach is similar in spirit to that of Anenberg et al. (2015) who apply a frontier estimation approach used frequently in the industrial organizational literature to estimate borrower-specific loan amounts available, but who do not incorporate credit conditions around LTV, LTI or DSR into their analysis.
We construct CA so that it can directly incorporate three distinct types of credit condition by allowing all borrowers to have three potential loans. We reiterate that it is crucial to distinguish these loans, which are measures of the supply of credit available to each borrower, from the observed loan amount that was actually borrowed, as the latter is a function of both supply and demand for credit.
The three loans associated with each borrower are outlined in turn:
Loan LT V is the loan that is consistent with the deposit or down-payment available to the borrower, combined with the maximum LTV that banks are offering on the market at the time of mortgage origination. This measure of credit supply, LT V M ax , is calculated as the 98th percentile of observed originating LTVs in the market in a given quarter. The evolution of this metric from 2003q1 to 2010q4 is depicted in Figure 2 . The data suggest that down-payment constraints were essentially eliminated during most of the sample period in Ireland, with the advent of 100 per cent LTV mortgages. Under such a regime, there is an infinite amount of credit available to borrowers along this channel.
Loan LT I is the loan that is consistent with the borrower's income at origination, combined with the maximum LTI that banks were offering in the market at that point in time. We use total household gross income, as this is the measure that is used by Irish banks when calculating the LTI. Source: Central Bank of Ireland Loan Level Data, authors' calculations
Loan DSR is the loan consistent with the maximum monthly repayment that a bank will sanction at time t. This repayment, RepayM ax it is the product of borrower i's net monthly income and the monthly maximum DSR being offered by banks at time t. The available DSR, calculated as the 98th percentile of observed originating DSRs in the data, is pictured in Figure 5 . 
Armed with three potential loans per borrower, each of which is a function both of a key borrower characteristic and a prevailing supply-side credit condition, CA is calculated simply as the minimum of the three loan sizes. As an illustration, if a borrower has a deposit of e5,000 and the prevailing available Loan to Value ratio is 90 per cent, that borrower will not get a mortgage larger than e45,000 (i.e. the deposit of e5,000 comprises 10 per cent of the purchase of a property worth e50,000), regardless of income, age, the prevailing interest rate, or credit conditions along the LTI and DSR channels. One innovation of our research is an attempt to ensure that CA is constructed using the levels of LTV, LTI and DSR that were made available by lenders, i.e. CA represents supply-side availability of credit. We argue that by taking the 98th percentile of observed originating LTV, LTI or DSR in the market in a given quarter, we are able to proxy the credit available to any borrower, should they have wished to access such a large volume of credit. 7 Taking the right tail of the observed distribution of LTI, LTV or DSR is a valid proxy for the amount available to any borrower if one accepts the assumption that in every time period there is a tail of borrowers with an insatiable appetite for credit, who will always take a higher LTV, LTI or DSR if a bank is willing to offer it. If this group of borrowers exists, the right tail of observed LTV, LTI or DSR values represents an approximation of the point at which banks' credit supply restricts the amount of credit available. A very similar line of thought is invoked by Anenberg et al. (2015) in estimating a "loan frontier" which approximates the supply-side availability of credit using US mortgage data. The existence of borrowers who will go to the maximum amount available is confirmed in the Canadian mortgage market by Allen et al. (2015) who show that, upon the move from 10 per cent to 5 per cent minimum downpayments in 2003, up to one third of affected mortgage borrowers moved to this new minimum downpayment amount, with a subsequent increase in the average household debt to equity ratio from 8 to 14.
The imposition of a market-wide 98th percentile LTV, LTI or DSR in the calculation of CA for all borrowers may seem crude, given that lender may impose differential lending standards in different market segments. The experience in Ireland suggests that this is less of a concern for this study than those in other jurisdications: anecdotal evidence in Ireland suggests that lenders offer mortgages as standard products, whereby once any borrower is deemed credit-worthy, they can access loans at the same level of LTV, LTI or DSR. As a robustness check to our empirical house price model, we allow 98th percentile values to be calculated within specific subgroups of the market, to allow for the fact that lenders may differentiate the level of LTV, LTI or DSR at which they lend as a function of borrower characteristics.
3 House price regression model
Empirical approach
A key aim of our research is to estimate the link between credit availability and house prices which will allow us to evaluate the impact of macro-prudential limits in the mortgage market. By running a regression model at the property level where CA is shown to have an effect on house prices, we can then trace a link through from a change in macroprudential policy rules to a new calculation of CA for every mortgage borrower to estimates of fitted house prices under the policy regime. Our construction of CA as incorporating LTI, LTV and DSR means that macroprudential rules can be easily mapped to borrower-specific credit shocks. To test the link between credit and house prices, we specify a reduced form model of house prices at the loan level using the following:
Where the dependent variable HP it is the euro price of the house sold, CA is our measure of credit availability, Income is measured as the total income of borrowers filling in the mortgage application, λ RT is a vector of 256 region * time control variables. These dummy variables will capture all local macroeconomic dynamics that would be expected to impact the housing market in a given quarter, including any feedback between house price developments and banks' lending standards. We do not believe it plausible that the price paid by an individual house purchaser should impact banks' lending standards vis-''a-vis that particular homeowner, once we are controlling for aggregate lending standards. Therefore, we argue that the λ RT purge our loan-level estimates of the impact of credit availability on house purchase prices from the reverse causality concerns that typically arise when estimating the effect of credit on house prices using aggregate data.
In our data, we do not observe the total wealth of the borrower so instead must rely on the posted value of the deposit as a proxy. Of concern is that down-payments are at the discretion of the borrower.
A borrower may have wealth available of e100,000, but may have a preference for lower leverage or for continuation of savings, and therefore holds back a significant portion of her wealth and posts a deposit of e50,000. Our model above would in this case underestimate both W ealth and Loan LT V , given that it is calculated based on the value of e50,000 and the prevailing LTV limits. We make an effort to adjust the deposit amount to account for the fact that borrowers vary in their risk and leverage appetite, and post down-payments which are some fraction of the true wealth available for house purchase. Our approach is to take groups of households that are unique in their First Time Buyer status (two categories), income quintile within originating year (5 categories), group of originating year (3 categories), marital status (3 categories) and Dublin status (2 categories). Within these distinct groups, we take the average ratio of deposit to income ( D I ). W ealth is then calculated as
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the above explanatory variables. The average house price in our sample is circa e314,000 with a standard deviation of e127,000. Average credit availability in our data is e367,000. As expected, this is higher than the average loan size in the data and reflects the value of credit the bank would have been willing to extend given the borrowers' characteristics. Mean income is approximately e61,000 while average posted deposit (our wealth proxy) is e133,000. 
Estimation results
Results from our baseline model are reported in Table 2 . The coefficient on CA is extremely stable across columns (1) and (2), where firstly the down-payment posted is used to proxy wealth, and secondly our adjusted measure is used. A one-euro increase in CA is associated with an increase in the value of house purchased of 20.5 to 21.8 cents. Older borrowers purchase less expensive houses, ceteris paribus. One additional year in age is associated with a fall in house value of e850-1,070. Our controls for property types have important explanatory power. Relative to Dublin detached houses, a non-Dublin apartment sells on average for more than e100,000 less. The smallest coefficient, in absolute value terms, is for Dublin semi-detached and terraced houses, suggesting that this is the second most valuable market segment in Ireland during the sample period.
Column (3) of Table 2 runs a log-log specification where CA, income and wealth are all entered in logarithmic form. The coefficients are thus interpretable as elasticities, with a 10 per cent increase in CA estimated to lead to a 1.5 per cent increase in HP . This elasticity estimate is strikingly close to those estimated in Favara and Imbs (2015), who provide estimates of the elasticity of house prices to credit supply of between .12 and .16. Our estimates of the elasticity of HP to income and wealth are .21 and .24, respectively.
In Table 3 , we examine the robustness of our findings on CA, W ealth and income to the inclusion of additional control variables at the loan and borrower level. In each model (1) to (4), the sample size is smaller than that in model (1) due to missing values for some of the additional explanatory variables. We introduce a dummy variable for First Time Buyers, self-employed borrowers and a threecategory marital status variable (single, married or separated/divorced) in combinations. Across all four models, the range of estimates for CA is between .2 and .27, which does represent an increase from the baseline model. The effects of income and wealth are in a very similar range in Table 3 to those estimated in Table 2 .
Finally we test the robustness of our model to the way in which CA is calculated. In the baseline model, CA is estimated using the 98th percentile LTV, LTI and DSR among observed mortgages in any given quarter. However, it may be that lenders systematically make credit available using differing degrees of risk aversion in different market segments. To directly test whether such behaviour has an impact on our results, we re-calculate CA by allowing 98th percentile values to be calculated both within-quarter and within-group. We define four separate robustness tests based on four groups: differentially, combined with more liberalised credit conditions in the FTB market in Figure A.2 suggests that credit is more elastically passed through to house prices when it is made available to an FTB than a previous owner. This finding is intuitive as FTBs are, in the main, the marginal borrowers and are most sensitive to credit availability and down payment constraints in their house purchase activity (Engelhardt, 1994; Engelhardt and Mayer, 1998; Barakova et al., 2014) . For the remainder of the paper, the coefficient estimates of the baseline model (2) of Table 2 will be imposed when assessing the role of macroprudential policy on the housing market. 
Macroprudential policy scenarios
Our methodology allows the imposition of any combination of LTV, LTI and DSR limits that the researcher wishes to test. For brevity, we impose two sample regimes which are described in Table   6 . Regime 1 is the more restrictive regime, where macroprudential limits are set at the high range of values reported across six economies by Jacome and Mitra (2015) . Regime 2 imposes less restrictive limits. We refrain from imposing a regime that combines the most restrictive limits reported in Jacome and Mitra (2015) as we deem it implausible for political reasons that such a combination would ever be imposed without a long lead-in period. In both regimes, LTV, LTI and DSR values are significantly below those that were available in Ireland during the sample period, as reported in Figures 2, 3 and 5.
In Figure 7 , we illustrate the impact of the two scenario macroprudential regimes on the way in which CA is determined for Irish borrowers between 2003 and 2010. The first key take-away message from Figure 7 is that, across both regimes, income-related restrictions appear to have far more of an impact than down-payment constraints. In Figure 7a , the LTV limit of 80 per cent is the determining factor for less than 20 per cent of borrowers across the 2003-2010 period. In the less restrictive regime in Figure 7b , the LTV limit of 90 has even less of an effect in determining CA.
The differing importance of the DSR limits across time is driven by either (i) changes in the prevailing interest rate or (ii) changes in the age profile of borrowers, or (iii) differing bank policies on the maximum borrower age at maturity. The timing of the increase in importance of the DSR between 2006 and 2008, when mortgage interest rates rose by 200 basis points over a two year period suggests that the interest rate channel is the more important of the above factors.
Re-fitting the house price series
We utilise the coefficient estimates of Column (2) of Table 2 to We are acutely aware of the limitations of such an approach, in that the counterfactual house price calculation using the coefficients of a reduced-form OLS regression merely fits a new house price to each borrower who purchased a property at a given point in time. There are a number of important long-run features that cannot be incorporated into our framework: (i) the exclusion of borrowers from the housing market, as we must assume that all borrowers simply access a cheaper house or the same house at a cheaper price, (ii) delayed house purchase due to the need for larger down-payments, (iii) a supply response to reductions in house prices (iv) increases in rents as a result of reduced access to owner-occupied housing, and the subsequent entry of Buy-to-Let investors in response to increased rental yields (v) general equilibrium effects such as the feedback loop between housing activity and incomes. For these reasons, we do not begin with the introduction of an MPP regime in period 1, and allow the model to estimate a counterfactual house price series for all periods. Rather, we restrict our exercise to the short run, where we assume that the above factors (i) to (v) may not have begun to take hold and influence house prices.
The most tractable way to estimate short-run effects in our framework is to iteratively cycle through the time periods in the data, starting with observed house prices in period t, switching on the MPP regime at t and allowing our model to estimate the cumulative impact of the regime on house prices up to period (t + 4) (our data are quarterly). This allows us to estimate one-year effects of MPP regimes on house prices. We believe that one year is a reasonable approximation of the "short run", beyond which readers may worry that general equilibrium effects such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph become particularly relevant. The methodology is outlined more formally as follows:
In period t, fitted house prices are calculated as in equation 7, where the coefficients of our baseline model are applied to observed data on our non-varying explanatory variables X t (income, property types, borrower age, region * time dummies), credit available CA t and W ealth t .
The model then dynamically cycles through periods t+1 to t+4, retaining all coefficient estimates β and values of the non-varying X it from the baseline model as fixed. The updating procedure for W ealth it and CA it at period t+1 is as follows: the average of the fitted house prices from the previous periodHP t is updated, and its ratio to house prices in the observed data is calculated. Our estimate of the wealth available for down-payments is then updated to reflect the differential between house prices at point t in the scenario, and average house prices in the data at period t (Equation 9). This adjustment allows borrowers in our counterfactual scenario to be impacted by housing equity changes due to MPP when placing a deposit with their house purchase. Such an interaction between housing collateral and house purchase price allows the logic of collateral channel models in the spirit of Kiyotaki 
CA t+1 = M in(Loan LT V,t+1 , Loan LT I , Loan DSR ) (11)
...
HP t+3 = mean(ĤP M P,t+3 ) (14)
As well as our main objective of testing how restrictions across LTV, LTI and DSR impact house prices, we can also test a secondary hypothesis relating to the timing of the measures being introduced.
What matters for the impact of such policies is how they deviate from the current credit conditions in the market. If MPP restricted levels are similar to current credit conditions, less of an impact on the housing market will be expected. For example, turning strict macroprudential loan restrictions on in a period of very loose market credit conditions will potentially have a larger impact on credit flows and subsequently house prices than in a period of tighter credit conditions.
To illustrate how such differential impacts, we "turn on" our macroprudential scenarios at two points in our data: 1) where market credit conditions were tighter (earlier in the Irish credit cycle)
and 2) where credit conditions were looser (at the peak of the Irish credit boom). In practical terms, we turn on the two scenarios outlined in Table 6 The right-hand panel of Figure 8 shows house price changes from an MPP regime switched on in 2003q1. As would be expected given that this period is much earlier in the Irish housing boom period, the magnitude of house price impacts for a given LTV-LTI combination is much smaller. However, the substantive patterns in the data remain the same when viewed from this different starting point.
An intuitive take-away from these images is that the expected impact of MPP regimes on the housing market varies as a function of the point in the housing cycle in which they are implemented. 
Percentage One−Year House Price Fall
One−year house price falls from 2003q1 as a function of LTV and LTI rules Source: Central Bank of Ireland Loan Level Data, authors' calculations. Each (X,Y) entry represents a scenario where an LTV limit of X and an LTI limit of Y are set simultaneously. DSR limits are not set in these models.
Conclusion
The link between macroprudential policy, credit allocation and the housing market is one of crucial importance to economic and financial stability. In this paper we present a novel measure of credit available at the loan level, where we model the way in which credit supply can bind along three channels: the Loan to Value ratio (LTV), the Loan to Income ratio (LTI) and the Debt Service Ratio (DSR). Using prevailing market conditions on the level of originating LTV, LTI and DSR available in a given quarter, we construct three possible loan amounts for each borrower, commensurate with their income, deposit and age. The credit available to a borrower is calculated as the smallest of these three loans.
We show initially that in Ireland between 2003 and 2010, the majority of borrowers had their credit availability determined by the prevailing LTI ratio, with extremely small numbers of borrowers being cut off along the LTV channel due to the existence of 100 per cent LTV mortgages.
Using our constructed measure of credit availability, we run a property-level house price model on 190,000 mortgaged house purchases, where the transaction price is a function of credit, incomes, deposits, a dummy variable for the lending institution, hedonic property characteristics as well as a range of national and regional macroeconomic factors. In our baseline scenario, the elasticity of house prices with respect to credit availability is found to be approximately 0.15, which is extremely close to estimates from Favara and Imbs (2015) . Our micro-level house price model also estimates that a ten per cent increase in income increases house prices by between 2.1 and 2.6 per cent while a ten per cent increase in wealth increases house prices by 2.4-2.5 per cent.
Our methodology allows us to directly model the link between MPP and each borrower's credit availability in a granular fashion. MPP drives house price changes in two ways: firstly through the direct impact of instantaneously lower credit volumes; secondly through the collateral channel, by scaling down the down-payment available to borrowers via weakened housing equity. We fit values using our regression coefficients and restricted credit for four quarters after the introduction of the MPP regime, due to the fact that our exercise cannot account for general equilibrium relationships between lower house prices and housing supply, rents, Buy to Let purchases or construction sector and related incomes.
Our findings imply an important role for MPP in cooling a rapidly-growing housing market. Further they suggest that the levels at which LTV, LTI and DSR limits are set are crucially important in determining the impact on prices. We show that the introduction of an LTV-LTI combination of 70 and 2.8 leads to a house price fall two and a half times as large as a combination of 95 and 4.5.
Further, we highlight the importance of the timing of the introduction of an MPP regime: estimates of the impact on house prices are orders of magnitude larger for regimes switched on in 2006, at the 
